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ANALYZING THE EXTERNAL SOCIAL CAPITAL OF FAMILY FIRMS 
 
Running title: Analyzing the external family social capital 
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ABSTRACT 
We examine an important yet overlooked aspect in research on social capital: the familial 
bonding that interorganizational relations may hold. We argue that the social identity of a 
family member is likely to reframe how they behave within social relations and towards 
actors outside the firm that are within or not within the family, changing the conditions for 
trust, knowledge exchange, and value creation. Drawing on a family and nonfamily 
classification of interorganizational relations, we examine: 1) theoretically and empirically the 
extent to which relationships with family members located in other related firms, which we 
define as external family social capital (EFSC), affect firm performance; (2) its interaction 
with relationships with members of other firms not bearing a family connection, referred to as 
external organizational social capital (EOSC); and (3) the varying levels of trust required to 
extract value from EFSC and EOSC.  
 
Keywords: Family social capital, family firm, organizational social capital, social networks, 
alliances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely known that social relations are vehicles for exchanging important knowledge 
having positive implications for organizational performance, and this represents one of the 
cornerstones of research into social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). As social relations 
develop to bear social capital, the trust that forms among social partners reinforces the 
positive effects of these relations on the exchange and combination of knowledge relevant for 
the organization. When ties and their associated social capital gain trust, not only is more 
productive knowledge transferred but its transmission occurs with fewer errors (Sorenson et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, we contest that the current depiction of why and in what ways social 
relations might be productive vehicles for the exchange of knowledge capable of positively 
affecting organizational performance is oversimplified, because researchers have treated 
interorganizational relations equally, when in fact these could be of very different nature. 
 One such substantially different aspect is the family feature: whether these 
interorganizational relations have a family bonding or not. When interorganizational relations 
bear a familial characteristic, mechanisms about trust and reciprocity and what it means to 
have exchange or social capital bonds between or among actors are likely to be very different 
than between two otherwise random connected actors. Arregle et al. (2007) posited that 
family firms are unique in that they possess at least two forms of social capital, family social 
capital and firm social capital. These authors’ point of departure was that a firm is not 
necessarily internally homogenous such that different social groups within the firm (in this 
case a family group and a non-family group) can affect how productive functional 
relationships are formed within the firm. Zahra (2010) also proposed the existence of such 
familial social capital, but expressed that while useful to the functioning and maintenance of 
the firm, familial social capital might not necessarily create value for the firm in comparison 
to the firm’s external social capital with other organizations. Arregle et al. (2007) and Zahra 
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(2010) treat family social capital as an intraorganizational phenomenon, leading to the view 
that while family social capital might help build external firm social capital, ultimately that 
external firm social capital is more valuable because it enables the firm to acquire knowledge 
and resources outside its borders. Yet, such a view ignores the fact that family businesses can 
capitalize on family relationships outside the traditionally-defined boundaries of the family 
firm (Anderson et al., 2005), by drawing on relationships with family members located in 
other related firms. These relations provide a new category of social capital, which we have 
defined as external family social capital (EFSC). 
 In reality, social relations among firms are held at the individual level (Zaheer et al., 
1998). Transcending a monolithic view of organizations (Pfeffer, 1982) to examine individual 
boundary spanning actors (Katz and Kahn, 1978) is therefore necessary to understand how 
trustful, valuable relations emerge among firms (Fang et al., 2015; Prashantham and 
Dhanaraj, 2010) with the potential to affect their performance frontier in competitively 
advantageous ways (Barney and Hansen, 1995). The family firms literature has long argued 
that family businesses have competitive advantages over nonfamily businesses but 
explanations for this difference is unclear (Hoffman et al., 2006; Patel and Fiet, 2011) and 
confusing (Chua et al.,1999), but might be better understood when looking at the family 
social system (Habbershon et al.,2003). Individual family members are an essential element 
of this social system and the family unit can provide the foundation for moral behaviour, the 
guidelines for cooperation and coordination, and the principles for reciprocity and exchange 
(Arregle et al., 2007; Bubolz, 2001) on which trust depends. Social identity theory (SIT) can 
help to explain this phenomenon (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). 
 We argue that the social identity associated with family and family ties has important 
implications for organizational behaviour, holding the potential to question and change our 
prior assumptions about social capital and about accruing benefit or value from social 
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relations. For example, the nature of trust and the magnitude of response to any call for 
information or assistance are likely to be very different among family members than with 
nonfamily members, with the need for trust being less relevant and a sense of obligation to act 
regardless of any likelihood of reciprocity overruling reticence. This social identity is 
connected to the socio-emotional wealth of family firms, understood as the non-financial 
aspects that meet the family affective needs, such as identification of the family with the firm 
or family influence (Gomez-Mejía et al., 2010), and their motivation to protect such affective 
endowments (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013, Haynes et al.,, 2015). At the heart of family 
social capital then is a moral infrastructure of norms, obligations, and expectations about how 
family members should behave and relate to one another (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009; 
Sorenson et al., 2009). This provides an almost automatic cognitive dimension to family 
social capital that would otherwise need cultivating within more traditional business actor 
relationships (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Trust in family members is far less a “leap of 
faith” compared to trusting nonfamily actors (Zaheer et al., 2007, p.143), but even without 
any future reciprocity from a family member, trust is unlikely to diminish or expectations not 
acted on because of the sense of familial obligation. Thus, the need for relational trust and 
dispositional trust in social relations are likely to be substituted by other mechanisms. 
SIT holds that people tend to classify themselves and others into various social 
categories that contain schemas and prototypical characteristics abstracted from and about its 
members (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Turner, 1985). These classifications cognitively segment 
the social environment, providing an individual with the means to define others and develop a 
set of working expectations (or stereotypical expectations) about them (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989). Normally, such stereotypes are not necessarily reliable (Hamilton, 1981) unless there 
is relative closeness to the social classification in question. Drawing on a simple family and 
nonfamily classification, individual family members located outside a focal firm but with 
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family ties to that firm carry a much higher social identification and consequently not just a 
prototypical or stereotypical set of characteristics, but a set of formal and longstanding moral 
guidelines, expectations, and obligations in how they interact with other family members 
regardless of their location (i.e., within or outside the boundaries of the family firm). Thus, 
the social identity of a family member is likely to reframe how they behave within social 
relations and towards actors outside the firm that are within or not within the family, changing 
the conditions for trust, for knowledge exchange, and value creation.  
 Drawing these themes together, we argue that the literature on social networks and 
social capital has failed to account for network context in a manner that may lead it to make 
false assumptions and predictions about the value of social relations to firms. It is long 
appreciated that examining networks structure without network content is insufficient to 
understand what value might accrue to firms and why (Koka and Prescott, 2002; Rodan and 
Galunic, 2004). But to fail to consider the context of different networks of social relations (in 
this case, family and nonfamily ties) risks inserting fundamental flaws into our understanding 
of the operation of social relations, knowledge exchange, and value creation.  
We therefore seek to answer the following research questions: To what extent does 
external family social capital (EFSC) affect firm’s performance? Do EFSC and external 
organizational social capital (EOSC) interact with each other? And, do these two types of 
external social capital require the same amount of trust to extract value from the relation? In 
answering these research questions we offer three important contributions to the literature. 
First, we suggest a new type of category within external social capital: external family social 
capital and we connect it with firm’s performance. We argue that through family 
organizational social capital, family firms can use their family contacts to connect with other 
companies to gain the knowledge necessary to stimulate their activities and developing 
revenue streams that generate profits and growth. These activities also safeguard against 
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conservatism that can plague some family firms. Second, we elaborate on the distinction of 
these two forms of external social capital: family versus organizational, exploring their 
complementary effects on firm’s performance. Third, by examining the distinct moderating 
effect that trust may have on the relationship between EFSC, EOSC, and performance, our 
study signals the importance of social identity over other relational characteristics (such as 
trust) in extracting value from interorganizational relations Our study respond to calls by 
Arregle et al. (2007), Sorenson et al. (2009), and Zahra (2010), among others, for 
examinations into the interactions of family firms with different groups of social actors in 
ways that might create competitive advantages, contributing to our collective understanding 
of family firm competitiveness and the role of social relationships in the creation of value. 
Other authors, such as Zamudio et al. (2014), have noted the importance of studies on the 
links between performance and intra and inter-firm networks.  
 
THEORY 
Social Identity Theory  
Social identity is the part of an individual’s self-concept which stems from their knowledge of 
their belonging to a social group together with the value and emotional significance 
embedded into that membership (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). It leads to activities that are congruent 
with the identity and to behaviour that is based on perceptions of intra-group similarity 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Individuals belonging to a social group have some behavioural 
expectations based on the social categories of an identity standard they represent within the 
group. 
 Social identity theory (SIT) holds that individuals form and classify themselves into 
social categories as a way of defining prototypical characteristics abstracted from the 
members (Turner, 1985) and new ‘members’ are then assigned these prototypical 
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characteristics as a way of setting predictions and expectations about their likely behaviours 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989), regardless of how inaccurate or unreliable these might be 
(Hamilton, 1981). These classifications enable individuals to make sense of their social 
environment and define themselves in relation to others (Deephouse and Kaskiewicz, 2013). 
Thus, such construction of social identity groupings might be thought of as uncertainty-
reducing mechanisms set within a pretext for belonging. 
 SIT is more complex than this, however, and such a reductionist view masks the 
implications of social identity classifications for how individuals approach and behave 
towards others, as well as the system of expectations and constraints around that. Apart from 
generating stereotypes for social identity groups about expected characteristics and 
behaviours, social identity groupings also enable individuals to locate and define themselves 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Within SIT then, an individual’s self-concept contains their 
personal identity and social identification as a perception of their oneness or belongingness to 
a larger aggregate of people (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  The comparison is a relative one 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1985).  Although not always the case, identity in this instance contains 
evaluations and expectations about effort (behaviour) and loyalty (affect) (Tajfel, 1978). It is 
at this juncture where the theory becomes highly relevant to understanding the potential scope 
of behaviour by family members located outside a family group and contained within another 
organization. 
 
SIT and Family Firms 
Themes and constructs contained within SIT have already been inadvertently raised and 
evoked in research on family firms’ social capital and research into familial relationships. For 
example, themes such as ‘the family point of view’ (Sorenson et al., 2009), moral 
infrastructure (Hoffman et al., 2006; Sorenson and Bierman, 2009; Sorenson et al., 2009), 
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moral behaviour (Arregle et al., 2007; Bubolz, 2001), the social capital of familiness (Sharma, 
2008), family members’ embeddedness in entrepreneurial networks (Anderson et al., 2005), 
and ideas of family norms (Hoffman et al., 2006) in some shape or form evoke the image of 
the family as a social group. Contemporary research has also applied SIT directly to describe 
the strength of family members’ identification with a family firm, relative to non-family 
members in similar positions at family or non-family firms, and the rewards that may bring 
(Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013).In SIT, it is posited that social identification is a 
perception of the cohesion and unity of a group of people that can be categorized around a 
social identity, and that group social identity in some shape or form exhibits a particular 
distinctiveness and even prestige (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Importantly, this social 
identification leads to behaviors that would be expected to be congruent with the social 
identity and support institutions, norms, expectations, and obligations (unwritten) that 
embody membership of that identity group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). From the perspective 
of a familial social identity, stereotypical and prototypical characteristics are likely to be far 
more concrete, shaped by norms, expectations, and obligations set out by codes of moral 
infrastructure and behaviour within the family unit. Importantly, research in social 
psychology finds that when individuals identify with a particular social group, they tend to act 
in favour of these ‘in-groups’ (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1979). The moral 
infrastructure of a family unit is made up of a set of beliefs about family, business, and the 
community, in which it sits, specifying how these entities should relate to one another 
(Hoffman et al., 2006). In a family firm sense, as interactions among family members, 
business, and wider individuals in the community outside its boundaries develop and grow 
over time, expectations about anticipated and acceptable behaviours, norms, beliefs, and 
obligations within the family are internalized within its social group.  When families go on to 
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establish businesses, the beliefs and norms internalized within the family group would be 
expected to carry over into the businesses they form (Sorenson et al., 2009).  
There are clear parallels in the emergence and development of a group social identity 
within SIT to the formation of social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002), primarily because the 
cognitive component of social capital (shared representations, interpretations, norms, and 
systems of meaning informing what is expected during cooperative behaviour) (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998) overarches with the cognitive process of segmentation, classification, and 
identity-building that takes place when social identity groups form (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989).  
 The family as a social identity group provides a foundation for moral behaviour and 
sets principles informing the nature of cooperation and coordination among its members (e.g., 
Arregle et al., 2007).  It also sets in place principles of exchange and reciprocity (Bubolz, 
2001). These codes, values, and rules are capable of not just surviving generations but also of 
disseminating and diffusing throughout the wider family unit over time, facilitating further 
integration, cohesion, and survival (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Bourdieu, 1994). The success 
to which such norms take hold in part depends on the nature of the collaborative dialogue 
between family members (Sorenson et al., 2009), but it would be expected that barring any 
substantial problems, as family relationships continue and increase, the interaction that takes 
place produces greater expectations about obligatory support, exchange, and reciprocity 
(Arregle et al., 2007). Stated slightly differently, among family members, greater generosity 
and inclination to provide support even in distant family relationships would be expected 
(Bourdieu, 1994). Family firms might then have a greater initial stock of social capital than a 
typical firm and that social capital would be at less risk of decay (e.g., Prashantham and 
Dhanaraj, 2010). 
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Social Capital and its Forms in Family Firms 
Social capital consists of the reciprocal relationships between individuals and organizations 
that facilitate action and create value (Adler and Kwon, 2002). However, these relationships 
are ultimately at the individual level, between an actor in one firm and an actor in another, but 
bear relevance for an organizational-level outcome, namely performance (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Some authors have described social capital in terms of internal relationships within firms 
(Coleman, 1990), whereas others have been mainly focused on external links (Burt, 1992). 
More recently, Adler and Kwon (2002) classified social capital as bridging (external focus) 
and bonding (internal focus) social capital. However, there is not a clear classification of 
social capital in the literature. 
For family firms, a broadly accepted classification is that social capital falls into two 
broad categories (Zahra, 2010): Family Social Capital (FSC) and Organizational Social 
capital (OSC). Family social capital results from the resources and benefits obtained from the 
relationships and interactions among family members within the firm, whereas organizational 
social capital (OSC) derives from both intra- and inter-organizational relationships (Arregle et 
al., 2007). Similarly, as a firm’s internal social capital is divided into family social capital and 
internal organizational social capital, we argue that an analogous classification can be made to 
the external social capital of the firm. Family members within a family firm can capitalize on 
resources embedded in ties with family members that reside outside the boundaries of the firm 
and located in other firms (Anderson et al., 2005). In other words, family social capital has an 
external component which is ignored in recent treatment (Arregle et al., 2007; Zahra, 2010). 
This can be seen in Table 1, where we have drawn a 2x2 matrix leading to four different 
quadrants. On one axis we have represented the internal (within-organizational ties) or 
external (inter-organizational ties) nature of social capital. On the other axis we have 
represented if the social capital is of a kinship type or a non-kin type. The new definition of 
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social capital we proposed in this work lies in Quadrant 3, which has been largely ignore in 
the literature, leading to what we defined as external family social capital (EFSC). 
Frequently, family firms interact with other family members that are external to their 
firms but that work in the same type of business. For example, very often upon the death of 
founders or owners, family firms are split among descendants and we can find several firms 
stemming from the same family firm that are involved in the same industry. Family owners of 
these firms and family members hold relationships and communicate with each other sharing 
knowledge, either explicitly or tacitly, promoting social capital that makes it possible to 
obtain resources from other companies. Moreover, they would exhibit and share a close if not 
identical social identity of the family group, rendering a common basis for supporting each 
other under SIT (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) and social capital theory (Hughes et al., 2014; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). The diffusion of family members into 
other businesses may also occur as part of ‘spinning out’ into their own ventures wherein 
family members often act as donors (Arregle et al., 2007) and support start-up (Anderson et 
al., 2005).  
In a somewhat different vein, Zahra (2010) specified the importance of family firms 
connecting with new ventures as vanguards of radical change to achieve their own long term 
survival, profitability, and prosperity. Zahra’s (2010) logic can be extended to situations 
where those new ventures can conceivably be by other family members. But regardless of the 
origin of any business connection, a family firm is capable of drawing on ties with 
unconnected others in external organizations for entirely objective business reasons just as 
they could connect with family members in such external organizations. From a SIT 
perspective, there might be advantages to doing so because of the family identity and the 
moral infrastructure that it connects to. 
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In contrast to a family context, a network of connections with nonfamily actors across 
a range of business organizations does not carry the same qualities or processes for stability, 
interdependence, interaction, or commonality (Arregle et al., 2007; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). But strategic relationships with business organizations can expose the family firm to 
novel pockets of idiosyncratic knowledge (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) and heterogeneous 
resources vital for growth (Hite and Hesterly, 2001), particularly when used in conjunction 
with the family firm’s own resources to innovate new combinations (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). 
Diverse relationships in this respect can also expose the family firm to new knowledge and 
reduce the risk of knowledge redundancy caused when ties exhibit too much overlap or 
closeness (Burt, 1992). Thus, relationships with nonfamily members in a diverse group of 
firms can provide a variety of resources and knowledge needed to innovate (Uzzi, 1997).  
Taken together, ties with family and nonfamily members in external organizations 
outside the boundaries of the firm may be capable of presenting different benefits to the 
family firm.  We define the resources obtained from external family links as external family 
social capital (EFSC), and define external organizational social capital (EOSC) as the 
resources that result from family firms’ interactions, communications and relationships with 
diverse external nonfamily actors. Therefore, we suggest that external social capital, ESC, (or 
OSC as defined in Arregle et al., 2007) can be divided into EFSC and EOSC.  
 
Trust in Relationships held by Family Firms 
Trust is required for the exchange and combination of knowledge and resources to take place 
in any set of relationships. Trust in the family firm context might not necessarily fit current 
conceptualizations of trust, either as dispositional or relational (Zaheer et al., 1998), or 
contractual (governance-based) or knowledge-based (Gulati, 1995). Trust is important 
because it reduces opportunistic behaviour and thus reduces transaction costs associated with 
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exchange which reduces the need for formal and heavily-defined contracts as a governance 
mechanism (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Gulati, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1998).  Zaheer et al. 
(1998) distinguish dispositional trust as an individual’s expectancies about the trustworthiness 
of others and in a family context with a strong social identity, it would be expected that high 
deference to the family as a symbol of trustworthiness might exist. But trust is also likely to 
bear a relational component, being based on experience and interaction with an exchange 
partner.  This form of trust is much more likely in relationships with nonfamily actors 
whereas  in a family context might be overruled by the social identity of the family and 
expectations and norms about obligatory support and reciprocity laid out within its moral 
infrastructure. There is no absolute certainty of support in either case, but even in the absence 
of social capital, some obligation may reside from the family social group as an identity in 
this context. 
 On the other hand, the inter-actor trust that underpins social capital depends on a 
behavioural component capturing the degree of confidence exchange partners have in each 
other’s reliability and integrity. The greater the confidence that these expectations will be met 
reflects knowledge-based trust (Gulati, 1995). Confidence is the predictability that positive 
expectations about another’s behaviour will be met (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), but also the 
expectation that an actor can be relied upon to fulfil their obligations without opportunistic 
behaviour taking place (Zaheer et al., 1998). In a family social group situation, or what 
Arregle et al. (2007) define as “a group with closure” (p.76), such ‘bad’ behaviour would 
incur severe group social sanctions (Portes, 1998). We suggest that the social group identity 
facilitates a level of commitment that reduces the need for contracts, controls, and oversight 
procedures in ways that would not be the case in relationships with nonfamily members 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Coleman, 1988). Thus, in a family context, owing to the dynamics 
of the social identity at play and the moral infrastructure the family provides within that 
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context, the need to build trust in the classic and formal sense is likely to be very different, 
with residual expectations and obligations in place prior to any previous business connection 
between the two family actors. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Family firms often split and divide over time, either among descendants upon the death of 
founders or owners, or as family members spin out to form their own business venture. This 
tendency explains why we can find several firms involved in the same industry stemming 
from the same family firm. Family owners of these firms can hold relationships through 
formal or informal ties (Kontinen and Ojala, 2011) and obtain benefits and resources from 
each other leading to what we have defined as External Family Social Capital. Reports 
suggest that this type of family tie may represent a quarter of key network external ties 
(Anderson et al., 2005). According to the definitions the literature has given to bonding and 
bridging social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Sharma, 2008), EFSC lies between both 
categories: it may be considered as bonding social capital (as it is derived from within the 
family) and as bridging social capital (as it stems from sources that are external to the firm).  
Family members frequently share knowledge, either explicitly or tacitly, often around 
family gatherings and occasions, both formal and informal (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009), 
promoting relational capital that makes it possible for these firms to obtain resources from 
each other. EFSC is appropriable in the sense that it can be used for other purposes than it was 
initially thought of or intended for. Through family communication, in formal or informal 
meetings such as around a family meal family members develop common beliefs about their 
family and business identity (Soreson and Bierman, 2009). Furthermore, these relationships 
can serve as pipes through which firms can access new links to other non-family actors. As 
this type of family social capital refers to relationships among family members in different 
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firms but within the same business, the quality and specificity of the knowledge exchanges 
can be very high and intense, therefore representing a very valuable resource to gain 
competitive capabilities and therefore superior performance. 
According to Barney (1991), to leverage firms’ resources and to make the most of 
them in providing sustained competitive advantages, these resources need to possess four 
characteristics: they need to be rare, valuable, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable. EFSC 
feature all four characteristics. Literature has widely asserted that family relationships 
represent unique resources (Arregle et al., 2007) that play an important role in creating value 
for firms (Salvato and Melin, 2008), particularly as they maintain a ‘family language’ which 
allows them to communicate and share knowledge more efficiently (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996), 
and because family ties are stronger, more intense and more enduring than non-family ones 
(Hoffman et al., 2006). Family social capital exists within family relationships and cannot be 
readily imported or hired (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009). Family relationships have also been 
found to be inimitable and non-substitutable (Hoffman et al., 2006). We can argue that blood 
is thicker than water. 
Obviously, some families may not maintain relationships, as a consequence of family 
conflict or family rivalry, which may hinder the “sense of identity”. These firms would have 
low or null family social capital and would behave similarly to non-family firms. But these 
external family ties represent an asset available to some family firms that, as any asset, could 
be used or not in this case to create external family social capital. We argue that when it is 
used to produce EFSC, then it is a very valuable resource to be used to gain better competitive 
advantages. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), focusing on social networks, pointed at four tie 
characteristics as the determinants of social capital: stability, interdependence, interaction, and 
closure. The four of them are strong in family ties. Family relationships tend to endure over a 
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lifetime and be kept through repeated interaction at informal family meetings, promoting 
stability and strong interaction (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Because a strong social 
structure already exists around families, family capital is readily available (Hoffman et al., 
2006). Kinship relationships also make family members dependent on each other (Arregle et 
al., 2007) and often families maintain dense networks. Arregle et al., (2007) suggest that as 
the family evolves, more information exchanges can occur and it is also likely that, as the 
family circle grows (expanding it further to the firm’s borders), the group becomes more 
heterogeneous germinating new ideas and knowledge (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2007) 
leading firms with many links to different family members to gain better competitive 
advantages resulting in superior performance. Relationships with external family members 
have been said to provide some extra benefits when compared to IFSC as they provide greater 
diversity (Anderson et al., 2005) and the conflict derived from the firm-business blurred 
borders is not present as may occur with IFSC. Resources exchanges through informal 
networks also transmit norms develop by social identity and social support (Molina and 
Martínez-Fernández, 2009). This is consistent with research that maintain that having 
numerous relations gives firms the opportunity to exchange and combine resources more 
efficiently (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). From the above, we suggest:  
H1: The amount of external family social capital is positively associated with firm 
performance. 
 
While EFSC is a relevant asset to the firm, being able to manage this unique resource 
is crucial to obtain the most of its benefits (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). To leverage EFSC and to 
obtain the desired advantages from it, a certain amount of firm-specific tacit knowledge is 
required. Literature has assumed that tacit knowledge is more easily available and shared 
among family ties than among non-family ties (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) due to the shared 
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vision, common language and strong, enduring relationships that family members often hold 
(Hoffman et al., 2006). However, if the network is focused only on kinship, it can get too 
homogeneous to provide a range of diverse resources (Anderson et al., 2005). Consequently, a 
variety of sources is more likely to generate sustainable advantages. It is important that 
managers do not rely only on family ties but also on acquiring external new and non-
redundant resources (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003) to get the most out of the social networks and, 
consequently, to improve performance (Sorenson et al., 2009). Further to this, some authors 
(Patel and Fiet, 2011) maintain that managers in family firms are more successful in 
combining diverse information than managers of non-family firms and that family firms have 
greater economies of scope in combining diverse information. Therefore, we suggest that the 
amount of external family social capital exerts not only a direct, but also an indirect effect on 
performance as it interacts with the benefits that can be acquired through non-family ties. 
Consequently, and analogously to what the literature maintains regarding internal 
family social capital, if a firm does not maintain new forms of relationships outside of their 
family network, it will experience increasingly redundant knowledge and will lack the variety 
of knowledge, abilities and skills necessary to reach a rich social capital (Coleman, 1990) 
capable of rewarding firm performance. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The amount of external family social capital and external organizational social 
capital interact with each other by reinforcing their effects on performance. 
 
Transferring rich knowledge requires not only time and effort but also trust (Sirmon 
and Hitt, 2003). In a dyad transferring knowledge two parties exist: the ego and the alter. 
While trust is key to the ego’s willingness to provide knowledge and resources and in order to 
be open to receive knowledge from the other party, the alter’s trust is also relevant as 
otherwise he or she may be reluctant to share their own resources. Consequently, trust can be 
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regarded as an attribute of a relationship (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) that allows the two parties 
of a relationship to rely on each other (Hoffman et al., 2006).  
Trust has been seen as an antecedent of cooperation (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and it 
needs to be built over time through intensive relationships. When a firm trust the alter, it 
becomes more willing to share its resources and information (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and 
becomes more open to receive knowledge from the other party (McEvily and Marcus, 2005). 
Interorganizational ties without some level of trust appear to be impossible as these 
relationships are voluntary (Leana and Van Buren, 1999). Consequently, we argue that for 
interorganizational relationships to effectively create high levels of organizational social 
capital, they need high doses of trust, with these relationships being much more effective in 
cases of high trust ties than in cases of low trust ties. This is particularly relevant for external 
social capital, as the alters not only do not belong to the same firm but may represent a 
competition for the ego’s firm as well.  
Trust involves taking risks in order to receive a reward (Leana and Van Buren, 1999), 
either expecting equal benefits (fragile trust) or unequal benefits (resilient trust). Strong 
family norms lead to obligations and expectations such as knowledge exchanges among 
family parties without the need to expect explicit and immediate benefits in return (Pearson et 
al., 2008), but expecting that the family will work for them when the time comes (Hoffman et 
al., 2006). Obligations to the family encourage enduring network ties wherever they might 
reside, which are less likely in nonfamily firms (Pearson et al., 2008). In many family 
relationships, often they may not expect benefits in return, at least in terms of knowledge 
transfer (Pearson et al., 2008). In this type of relationship, although they may vary from one 
family to another (Hoffman et al., 2006), frequently knowledge is given away based on tacit 
norms, commitment and altruism, due to the family nature of the ties, but not expecting any 
benefits out of it or in return. Consequently, the literature has assumed that family firms are 
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rich in resilient trust (Pearson et al., 2008). Family relationships are based on moral 
infrastructure (Sorenson and Bierman, 2009), defined as the beliefs that family members have 
about themselves and how they relate to each other (Hoffman et al., 2006). Moral 
infrastructure implies norms, obligations and expectations that promote family cooperation 
(Sorenson and Bierman, 2009) without expecting to be paid back in the short term with the 
same coin, so to speak. Resilient trust has been labelled as knowledge-based trust or 
generalized trust by some authors. Drawing from Social Identity Theory, we can maintain that 
generalized trust (Leana and Van Buren, 1999), understood as an embedded trust where 
individuals trust one another simply by virtue of being in the same social system, 
characterizes systems with strong social capital such as the family system. Family identity is 
often strong (Pearson et al., 2008) and acts as a catalyst for information exchange and 
cooperation (Pearson et al., 2008). Ties based on generalized trust do not have to be based on 
frequency of the interaction but are strong through association (Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  
Though some families may indeed not hold relationships and will not keep that “sense 
of identity” or “sense of belonging” and may not be characterized by generalized trust among 
their members, those that maintain relationships are rich in resilient trust and have Family 
Social Capital constantly available (Pearson et al., 2008) which can be used for business 
purposes as an strategic resource (Hoffman et al., 2006, Soreson and Bierman, 2009). 
Frequent and close relationships allow an ego and an alter to share higher amounts of 
knowledge and this is assumed to increase over time in well-established relationships (Tsai 
and Ghoshal, 1998) as may well be the case in many family ties regardless of their 
expectations about receiving any benefits in return, at least in terms of obtaining knowledge 
(Pearson et al., 2008).While family capital is assumed to rely upon contextual beliefs, the 
sense of belonging, and norms that flow out of family structure and rules, organizational 
social capital is assumed to be based upon social norms and reciprocate favours (Danes et al., 
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2009). Therefore, in the absence of substantial family conflict, family members will act as 
‘donors’ in favour of other family members making knowledge available for other family 
members for generosity, solidarity, and altruism (Bourdieu, 1994) and based on some 
behavioural norms underlying the family network (Arregle et al., 2007) such as the feeling of 
obligation (Karra et al., 2006). Even in cases of conflict, some authors have suggested that 
family social capital plays a crucial role in increasing performance (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2007). These characteristics substantively reduce the need to hold very high levels 
of trust, understood in terms of reciprocity commitments (expectations of getting knowledge 
transfer back) among them to obtain the relational benefits derived of holding family ties. 
These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Trust moderates the relationship between the amount of external organizational 
social capital and performance, to a greater extent than the relationship between the 
amount of external family social capital and performance. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample and method 
Our empirical application was carried out in the fishing sector. The study context is given by 
a group of firms that develop a traditional activity and are located in a limited space, which 
implies, initially, intense social interactions. For the sake of anonymity, we have not provided 
to this point, more geographical details. This sector is particularly rich in family firms with 
many inter-organizational family and non-family ties. All companies are composed of a 
fishing vessel which operates targeting the same species, which is a high-value species. All 
firms belong to the same fishery that is they all target the same species. We have surveyed the 
entire population of this fishery, a total of 132 companies. In general, they are very small 
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firms with just one owner and several employees (fishermen). In some cases, some of the 
employees belong to the same family as the owner.  
Captains may hold a different number of ties to other firms' captains and share 
information with them or they may opt for not sharing information with any other firms. The 
fishing vessels are located in two ports and within each port, firms work geographically very 
proximate, so that they can hold close relations with each other. Information sharing can be 
made more or less formal. Some firms have been operating over generations in the fishery and 
in some cases other members of the family are involved in the same activity but in different 
firms (uncles, cousins, brothers...) so that these captains have the opportunity to hold familial 
relations to them and share information with them. As this activity is very linked to a 
geographical area, the villages around are highly dependent and involved in the fishing 
business providing a good ground for strong social interactions.  
We carried out a serial of surveys to the captains asking them about the specific boats 
they share knowledge with. In the big majority of the cases, all ties were bidirectional, that is, 
when captain A recognizes sharing information with other vessels, these vessels also 
acknowledge holding relations with captain A. Only occasionally, the ties were not 
bidirectional and we omitted these relations from our study. We could then map a net with all 
the relations that are hold in the fishery. We found a total of 163 inter-organizational 
bidirectional ties. We then asked them which (if any) of the relationship were also 
characterized by holding also family ties, resulting in 65 bidirectional family ties (98 of 
external ties being non-kin ties). Therefore, we have considered two inter-organizational 
networks: one composed of ties with alters within the family circle (the family social 
network) and a second one composed of ties in which ego and alter do not hold any type of 
kinship, the (non-family) social network. In both of them informants have reported to share 
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knowledge with the alter. We also gather information about the type of knowledge exchanged 
and relational characteristics of the firms’ relations one by one. 
Therefore, we have two types of knowledge sharing networks: the family knowledge 
network and the non-family knowledge network (which includes the knowledge sharing ties 
with alters outside the family circle). The benefits and resources provided by the former 
represent the external family social capital (EFSC) whereas those provided by the latter 
represent the external (non-family) organizational social capital (EOSC) on performance. 
 
Variables and Measures  
In the survey, to measure external family social capital (EFSN), we asked respondents to tell 
us which firms they share information with and that also hold kinship ties to them. This gave 
us the family (knowledge sharing) social network. We then calculated the degree of centrality 
given by the number of family ties the firm holds within the external family social network, 
that is, with other family members that work within the same activity but in other firms. This 
represents the amount of EFSC.   
To measure external organizational social capital (EOSC), we asked respondents to tell us 
which firms they share information with among those that did not held any kinship ties to 
them. This gave us the non-family (knowledge sharing) social network. We then calculated 
again the degree centrality given by the number of (non-family) ties the firm holds within the 
external organizational social network, which represents the amount of EOSC. 
To measure Trust, we used the Zaheer et al. (1998) 6-item scale that has been 
validated and widely used in the literature measuring the trust the ego place on a certain alter. 
In the same way, and based also on the previous scale, we measured also the alter’s trust in 
the analysis. The average value of both measures has been considered as an indicator of the 
common trust within the dyad. 
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 We used an objective measure of Performance. We calculated the monthly total value 
of the catch and then we divided this value for the total amount of days at sea. The resulting 
figure, known as value per unit of effort (VPUE), is of common use among fisheries 
economist to measure performance. Then this figure was divided by the average of all firm's 
performance to make it a relative measure of performance with respect to the fleet. 
As control variables, we considered for the engine power of vessels, measured in horse 
power, which represents the capital invested in the vessel. More powerful vessels typically get 
higher catches. We also controlled for the number of employees, given by the number of crew 
members, which represents the human resources involved.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used. In Table 3 we present the 
hierarchical regression results. The amount of External Family Social Capital is highly 
significant in all models considered providing support to hypothesis 1a. Similarly the amount 
of External Organizational Social Capital is positively related to firm's performance which is 
in line with previous literature. We have analysed the interaction effect of the external family 
social capital (EFSC) and the external (non-family) organizational social capital (EOSC) on 
performance. In model 4, we can observe that the interaction effect of EFSC and EOSC is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, which supports hypothesis 2. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the effect of both types of social capital on performance is positive and that they 
reinforce each other. To better understand this interaction effect, we have plotted in Figure 1 
the interaction effect of both variables. We defined high (low) values of a variable as the 
mean +1 standard deviation (-1 standard deviation). We can observe that when a firm has a 
high amount of EOSC, the positive effect of EFSC on performance is reinforced, exerting a 
stronger positive effect on performance. From the interaction effect we can conclude that 
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EFSC is of high relevance and is reinforced by other non-family information. Therefore the 
highest effect on performance would be given by those firms rich in EOSC and in EFSC. 
Consequently, it can be argued that while family ties have many advantages on performance, 
this effect is rather mild if firms do not get out from the family circle. 
Trust appears significant in many models. However, the moderation effect that trust 
exerts on the relationship between EFSC and performance does not appear to be significant 
(Table 3, step 5). This is in line with what we stated in hypothesis 2, that supports the idea 
that the family social network has some sense of obligation embedded in their ties because of 
family identity, so that family members do not need expectations of reciprocity to share 
knowledge between them. On the contrary, trust moderates the relationship between the 
amount EOSC and performance, though the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level 
(Table 3, step 5). In case of high relational trust the higher the amount of EOSC, the higher 
the performance, whereas if trust is low, then the amount of external non-family social capital 
affects performance to a much lesser extent. We can see more clearly this moderation effect in 
Figure 2. We can observe that the EOSC hardly exert any influence on performance when the 
level of trust is low whereas it is much higher when there is high level of trust between both 
parties. 
We can then conclude that OESC is positively related to performance only if there is a 
certain amount of trust among firms. On the contrary, the effect of the EFSC on performance 
is positive regardless of the level of trust. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We contest that the current depiction of why and in what ways social relations might be 
productive vehicles for the exchange of knowledge capable of positively affecting 
organizational performance is oversimplified, because researchers have treated 
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interorganizational relations equally, when in fact these could be of very different nature. One 
such substantially different aspect in which we focus is the family aspect: whether these 
interorganizational relations have a family bonding or not. We find support for our arguments 
that when interorganizational relations bear a familial characteristic, mechanisms about trust 
and reciprocity, and what it means to have exchange or social capital bonds between or 
among family actors are likely to be very different than between two otherwise random 
unconnected actors. This has implications for the value created through the relation. Three 
key contributions emerge from the results of the study, as discussed next. 
 First, our results signal the importance of an overlooked aspect in research in social 
capital: the familial bonding that inter-organizational relations may hold. As predicted in 
hypothesis 1, the amount of relationships with family members located in other related but 
distinct firms, what we refer to as external family social capital (EFSC), is found to have a 
significant positive effect on firm performance. This result shows that family firms can use 
their family contacts to connect with other firms to gain the knowledge necessary to stimulate 
their activities and improve revenue streams that generate profits and growth. Indeed, ties 
with family members outside the organization but in related firms may have the advantages of 
strong, high-quality, low-cost ties while at the same time offering (non-redundant) knowledge 
from outside of the focal firm (Anderson et al., 2005). We therefore extend the work of 
Arregle and colleagues (2007) and Zahra (2010) advancing a new category of family social 
capital going beyond the traditionally-defined boundaries of the family firm relations, 
extending them from the intra- to the inter-organizational context.  
 Second, we elaborate on the distinction between EFSC and OESC showing that they 
have distinct yet complementary effects. Our results indicate that EFSC does not provide 
superior performance than OESC, in line with the literature stream that advocates the 
importance of bridging ties over bonding ties in creating value through inter-firm knowledge 
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transfer (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010; McEvily and Zaheer, 
1999) defending the advantages of knowledge heterogeneity and novelty over redundancy. As 
we have argued, EFSC is more likely to act as a vehicle of related knowledge that could be 
somehow redundant when compared with OESC which could give access to more 
heterogeneous sources of knowledge.  However, as predicted in hypothesis 2, the effects of 
EFSC and OESC show complementarities with their joint effect significantly enhancing firm 
performance. Thus, we add to extant research by demonstrating that different types of ties can 
exert complementarities (e.g., Tiwana, 2007) and that firms can extract superior value from 
their relations by combining a variety of relations. 
 Third, our results reveal the importance of social identity over other relational 
mechanisms in extracting value from interorganizational relations , and call for an integration 
of social identity and social capital theories. As predicted in hypothesis 3, trust positively 
moderates the relationship between the amount of OESC and performance to a greater extent 
than the relationship between the amount of EFSC and performance. This result signals that 
EFSC requires less relational efforts (i.e., trust) to leverage its potential, arguably due to the 
substitutive effect generated by the family social identity. This finding is important due to the 
costs embedded in building trust (e.g., Zaheer et al., 1998), which could be reduced by 
engaging in familial interorganizational relations. It seems that a social capital explanation of 
how relationships best function to create value is incomplete if social identity among groups 
of actors is not given consideration. An established social identify appears to heighten the 
value creating potential of social capital by simplifying the governance of a relationship. We 
thereby contribute to the further development of both theories by revealing their commonality 
and intersection in the context of family firms and value creation. 
Overall, our study theoretically contributes to social identity and social capital theories 
demonstrating the importance of combining these theoretical approaches in trying to shed 
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light on the unique nature of relations between different groups of social actors (for instance, 
interorganizational relations bearing a familial bonding versus those not bearing such a 
feature), which affect the distinct means through which value might be created. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESERACH DIRECTIONS 
Despite the strengths of the study research design, arising from having data about all 
relationships existing within a given group of firms, which gives us the possibility of mapping 
and taking into account all relationships among these firms and the relational characteristics 
among them, we should acknowledge its limitations.   
Notably, the sample consists of a limited number of firms in Spain from a particular sector. 
Given that the characteristics of, and benefits from inter-organizational relations may be 
different in other industry and country settings, future studies using samples drawn from other 
industries and countries may enhance the generalizability of our findings. More importantly, 
future studies should explore inter-organizational relations bearing a family aspect between 
firms operating in distinct industries since our study is restricted to relations within the 
boundaries of a single industry. Very often, relevant knowledge can and should be accessed 
from diverse and distant industries in order to build novelty. 
 We have focused on performance which is a key measure of firm value creation. Still, 
given the complexity and multidimensionality of firm performance, future researchers would 
benefit from considering alternative measures based on growth and innovation to complement 
our findings. Such studies could highlight any trade-offs in performance that firms might 
encounter when trying to capture value from inter-organizational relations of various natures 
(e.g. with or without a familial bonding). 
  While we have controlled for many effects, there are always more variables to 
consider.  For example, we have explored the relative importance of a particular relational 
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characteristic in extracting value from EFSC and OESC: trust. Future researchers may wish to 
examine other relational characteristics that could affect the firm ability to extract value from 
these different inter-organizational relations such as the strength and degree of cognitive 
cohesion of relational ties. 
 The role of social identity deserves further analysis and study. Future studies would 
benefit from measuring and capturing variations in social identity directly and relating it to 
performance in inter-organizational relations of different nature. 
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Table 1. Two-by-two matrix of social capital classification in family firms. 
 
Intra-organizational ties IFSC IOSC 
Inter-organizational ties EFSC EOSC 
 Kin relations Non-kin relations 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
  Average St dev Performance Capital Employees Trust EFSC EOSC 
Performance 1,000 ,483 1 
     
Capital 52,743 30,406 ,393
**
 1 
    
Employees 3,508 1,257 ,355
**
 ,451
**
 1 
   
Trust 4,328 ,354 ,119 -,154 ,010 1 
  
EFSC ,492 ,852 ,038 -,138 -,064 -,115 1 
 
EOSC ,742 ,954 ,131 ,132 ,256
**
 ,040 -,266
**
 1 
The first two columns represent the average and standard deviation of the key variables whereas the following ones represent the coefficient of correlation 
between each two variables. 
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Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Coeff. St. Error   Coeff. St. Error   Coeff. St. Error   Coeff. St. Error   Coeff. St. Error   Coeff. St. Error   
(Constant) 
 
,086     -,080     -1,858     -,733     -1,812     -1,866 
 
Capital ,223 ,094 * ,273 2,357 * ,287 2,633 ** ,288 2,709 *** ,278 2,495 * ,301 2,794 *** 
Employees ,224 ,093 * ,214 1,864 † ,164 1,497   ,165 1,547   ,163 1,477   ,199 1,816 † 
Trust 
  
  ,175 1,663   ,212 2,127 * ,190 1,947 * ,182 1,476   ,291 2,713 *** 
EFSC 
  
    
 
  ,383 3,265 *** ,504 3,982 *** ,389 3,272 *** ,353 3,023 *** 
EOSC             ,359 3,007 *** ,413 3,475 *** ,361 3,003 *** ,311 2,582 * 
EFSC*EOSC 
  
    
 
    
 
  ,236 2,222 *   
 
    
  
Trust*EFSC 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  ,051 ,412     
  
Trust*EOSC 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  ,199 1,823 † 
R square ,157     ,187     ,310     ,354     ,311     ,340     
Adjusted R sq. ,135 
 
  ,155 
 
  ,263 
 
  ,300 
 
  ,254 
 
  ,285 
  
Change in F 7,096 **   2,765     6,480 **   4,936 *   0,170     3,322 †   
Standardized coefficients are reported; significance levels based on two-tailed t-tests or F-tests.  
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
40 
 
Figure 1. Interaction effect of EFSC and EOSC 
 
 
This figure we have graphed the interaction effect of EOSC and EFSC on performance. The X 
axis corresponds to the level of EFSC whereas the Y axis corresponds to the standardized level 
of firm performance 
 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of EOSC and trust 
 
 
In this figure we have graphed the interaction effect of EOSC and TRUST on performance. The 
X axis corresponds to the level of EOSC whereas the Y axis corresponds to the standardized 
level of firm performance 
-1,5 
-1 
-0,5 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
Low EFSC High EFSC 
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
A
N
C
E
 
Low EOSC High EOSC 
-1 
-0,8 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-0,2 
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1 
Low EOSC High EOSC 
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
A
N
C
E
 
Low TRUST High TRUST 
